// teleport guide · Database · community

Teleport MongoDB MCP — read-only, P2P, zero cloud

MongoDB's MCP server connects with your connection string — the single most sensitive credential in a stack. Teleport find/aggregate and the peer's agent explores data through your tunnel; the connection string never crosses the wire. This guide maps all 10 tools of @mongodb-js/mongodb-mcp-server by blast radius, then gives you the exact command to share it with a remote teammate's AI agent — capability without credentials.

3SAFE to expose

2CAUTION

5KEEP LOCAL

0servers involved

host terminal — read-only share command

npx -y mcpwire share --allow "list_databases,list_collections,count" --redact-secrets --ttl 30m -- npx -y @mongodb-js/mongodb-mcp-server

Only the 3 read-only tools are exposed; the other 7 are invisible to the peer (filtered from tools/list and blocked if forced). Tunnel dies in 30 minutes. Add --confirm to approve every call, or --max-calls 20 for a hard budget.

peer config — claude_desktop_config.json / .cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "teleported-mongodb": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "mcpwire",
        "join",
        "wire://<TICKET_FROM_HOST_BANNER>"
      ]
    }
  }
}

🛡️ tool risk map — MongoDB

tool	risk	notes
`list_databases`	SAFE	Database inventory.
`list_collections`	SAFE	Collection inventory.
`find`	CAUTION	Queries documents — PII risk, keep DLP on.
`aggregate`	CAUTION	Aggregation pipelines.
`count`	SAFE	Document counts.
`insert_one`	HIGH RISK	Writes documents.
`insert_many`	HIGH RISK	Bulk writes.
`update_one`	HIGH RISK	Mutates documents.
`delete_one`	HIGH RISK	Destroys documents.
`create_index`	HIGH RISK	Index management.

🔒 Why not just share your token?

MongoDB's credential would grant the full toolset to a foreign LLM — including insert_one and insert_many. With mcpwire the credential stays in your env; the peer only ever holds an expiring wire:// capability scoped to 3 tools.

🎥 Audit everything

Add --record session.wirelog and every call, block and redaction is logged locally. Drag the file into mcpwire.co/replay for a DevTools-style waterfall of what the remote agent actually did.

🔁 Works with every MCP client

Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline — anything speaking MCP over stdio. Your peer pastes the snippet above; you keep the kill-switch (Ctrl+C) in your terminal.

What happens if the peer's agent tries to call a blocked MongoDB tool?

The request never reaches your MCP server. mcpwire answers with a JSON-RPC error (-32601 [MCPWire Firewall]) and logs the attempt — the tool doesn't exist from the agent's point of view, so well-behaved agents won't even try.

Can I expose the caution-level tools too?

Yes — just add them to --allow or run with --confirm so each call waits for your y/n in the host terminal. The risk map above tells you exactly what you'd be signing up for.

Is the traffic really serverless?

Yes. Discovery goes through the public Hyperswarm DHT; the data path is a direct Noise-encrypted socket between the two machines (UDP hole punching). If both NATs are stubborn, Hyperswarm routes through community relays — which only see ciphertext.

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