// teleport guide · Infra · community

Teleport Kubernetes MCP — read-only, P2P, zero cloud

Kubernetes MCP servers act on your kubeconfig: listing pods is diagnostics, scaling a deployment is an incident. MCPWire's firewall splits the two cleanly, and --ttl makes the access window explicit. This guide maps all 11 tools of @flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes by blast radius, then gives you the exact command to share it with a remote teammate's AI agent — capability without credentials.

6SAFE to expose

1CAUTION

4KEEP LOCAL

0servers involved

host terminal — read-only share command

npx -y mcpwire share --allow "list_pods,list_deployments,list_namespaces,list_nodes,list_services,describe_pod" --redact-secrets --ttl 30m -- npx -y @flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes

Only the 6 read-only tools are exposed; the other 5 are invisible to the peer (filtered from tools/list and blocked if forced). Tunnel dies in 30 minutes. Add --confirm to approve every call, or --max-calls 20 for a hard budget.

peer config — claude_desktop_config.json / .cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "teleported-kubernetes": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "mcpwire",
        "join",
        "wire://<TICKET_FROM_HOST_BANNER>"
      ]
    }
  }
}

🛡️ tool risk map — Kubernetes

tool	risk	notes
`list_pods`	SAFE	Pod inventory.
`list_deployments`	SAFE	Deployment inventory.
`list_namespaces`	SAFE	Namespace inventory.
`list_nodes`	SAFE	Node inventory.
`list_services`	SAFE	Service inventory.
`describe_pod`	SAFE	Pod details.
`get_pod_logs`	CAUTION	Log tailing — enable DLP scrubbing.
`scale_deployment`	HIGH RISK	Changes replica counts.
`delete_deployment`	HIGH RISK	Destroys workloads.
`delete_pod`	HIGH RISK	Kills pods.
`create_resource`	HIGH RISK	Applies arbitrary manifests.

🔒 Why not just share your token?

Kubernetes's credential would grant the full toolset to a foreign LLM — including scale_deployment and delete_deployment. With mcpwire the credential stays in your env; the peer only ever holds an expiring wire:// capability scoped to 6 tools.

🎥 Audit everything

Add --record session.wirelog and every call, block and redaction is logged locally. Drag the file into mcpwire.co/replay for a DevTools-style waterfall of what the remote agent actually did.

🔁 Works with every MCP client

Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline — anything speaking MCP over stdio. Your peer pastes the snippet above; you keep the kill-switch (Ctrl+C) in your terminal.

What happens if the peer's agent tries to call a blocked Kubernetes tool?

The request never reaches your MCP server. mcpwire answers with a JSON-RPC error (-32601 [MCPWire Firewall]) and logs the attempt — the tool doesn't exist from the agent's point of view, so well-behaved agents won't even try.

Can I expose the caution-level tools too?

Yes — just add them to --allow or run with --confirm so each call waits for your y/n in the host terminal. The risk map above tells you exactly what you'd be signing up for.

Is the traffic really serverless?

Yes. Discovery goes through the public Hyperswarm DHT; the data path is a direct Noise-encrypted socket between the two machines (UDP hole punching). If both NATs are stubborn, Hyperswarm routes through community relays — which only see ciphertext.

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