// teleport guide · Files · official

Teleport Filesystem MCP — read-only, P2P, zero cloud

The official Filesystem MCP server gives an agent full CRUD over a directory tree. With MCPWire you can teleport only the read primitives: an outside LLM can browse and search files, but write_file and edit_file are filtered out of tools/list entirely. This guide maps all 11 tools of @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem by blast radius, then gives you the exact command to share it with a remote teammate's AI agent — capability without credentials.

7SAFE to expose

0CAUTION

4KEEP LOCAL

0servers involved

host terminal — read-only share command

npx -y mcpwire share --allow "read_file,read_multiple_files,list_directory,directory_tree,search_files,get_file_info,list_allowed_directories" --redact-secrets --ttl 30m -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ~/projects/report

Only the 7 read-only tools are exposed; the other 4 are invisible to the peer (filtered from tools/list and blocked if forced). Tunnel dies in 30 minutes. Add --confirm to approve every call, or --max-calls 20 for a hard budget.

peer config — claude_desktop_config.json / .cursor/mcp.json

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "teleported-filesystem": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "mcpwire",
        "join",
        "wire://<TICKET_FROM_HOST_BANNER>"
      ]
    }
  }
}

🛡️ tool risk map — Filesystem

tool	risk	notes
`read_file`	SAFE	Reads one file.
`read_multiple_files`	SAFE	Batch read.
`list_directory`	SAFE	Lists one directory.
`directory_tree`	SAFE	Recursive tree listing.
`search_files`	SAFE	Filename search.
`get_file_info`	SAFE	Stat metadata.
`list_allowed_directories`	SAFE	Shows the sandbox roots.
`write_file`	HIGH RISK	Creates/overwrites files on YOUR disk.
`edit_file`	HIGH RISK	In-place edits.
`create_directory`	HIGH RISK	mkdir on your machine.
`move_file`	HIGH RISK	Moves/renames files.

🔒 Why not just share your token?

Filesystem's credential would grant the full toolset to a foreign LLM — including write_file and edit_file. With mcpwire the credential stays in your env; the peer only ever holds an expiring wire:// capability scoped to 7 tools.

🎥 Audit everything

Add --record session.wirelog and every call, block and redaction is logged locally. Drag the file into mcpwire.co/replay for a DevTools-style waterfall of what the remote agent actually did.

🔁 Works with every MCP client

Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline — anything speaking MCP over stdio. Your peer pastes the snippet above; you keep the kill-switch (Ctrl+C) in your terminal.

What happens if the peer's agent tries to call a blocked Filesystem tool?

The request never reaches your MCP server. mcpwire answers with a JSON-RPC error (-32601 [MCPWire Firewall]) and logs the attempt — the tool doesn't exist from the agent's point of view, so well-behaved agents won't even try.

Can I expose the caution-level tools too?

Yes — just add them to --allow or run with --confirm so each call waits for your y/n in the host terminal. The risk map above tells you exactly what you'd be signing up for.

Is the traffic really serverless?

Yes. Discovery goes through the public Hyperswarm DHT; the data path is a direct Noise-encrypted socket between the two machines (UDP hole punching). If both NATs are stubborn, Hyperswarm routes through community relays — which only see ciphertext.

← all teleport guides ⚡ open the policy builder

🔒 MCPWire Enterprise & Team Mesh (Early Access)

Need persistent wire://your-company/db namespaces, SSO / GitHub identity verification before the P2P handshake, and centralized audit logs for compliance (SOC2 / ISO)?